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La prhsence de h rhcente Canadian Social Union )) est 
hvidente duns les accords intergouvernementazuc et les institu- 
tions qui ont pris une plus grande place h l'exhcutif du 
gouvernement au dtriment des lois vothes. Ces arrangements 
ont d'importantes implications sur h reconnaissance de h 
dhmocratie avec des retombhes sur l'acc2s desfemmes et autres 
groupes qui dsirent I 2gallitPdans l2laboration despolitiques 
canadiennes . Cetarticle nous donne un aperp de cette union 
et identzje quelques uns des & ? S  majeursposhsaux organismes 
qui souhaitent l'kgaitth. 
"Canadian Social Union" has a nice ring to it. The phrase 
brings to mind social citizenship and the idea of bonds 
among members of society strengthened through state 
policy. Social rights would be the glue binding members 
of society to one another, as participants in a community 
sharing entitlements to levels ofsocial security by virtue of 
their membership in society. Indeed, Harvey Lazar has 
written that 
the social union is the idea that Canadians have 
similar social rights and obligations of citizenship, 
wherever in Canada they may live; and the instru- 
ments of the social union are the constitutional 
provisions, federal government mechanisms (such 
as the ability to tax, spend, and regulate) and inter- 
governmental arrangements (such as federal-provin- 
cial and interprovincial agreements, including inter- 
governmental transfers) that breathe life into this 
idea. (107) 
What this characterization ignores is that the birth of 
the new Social Union coincided with stripping poor 
Canadians of social rights with the elimination of the 
Canada Assistance Plan (CAP). The new Canadian Social 
Union is not primarily about relations of individuals to 
society, it is centrally about relations among governments. 
For the most part, social rights have been collateral 
damage in the larger game of intergovernmental relations. 
More precisely, the Social Union is not about strengthen- 
ing the social contract, but about managing social con- 
flicts in Canada through contract-like arrangements or 
quasi-contracts among governments. The "union" in 
Social Union is about relations among the executive 
branch (Cabinet andlor senior bureaucratic) at the fed- 
eral, provincial, and territorial levels of government. 
The new Canadian Social Union is manifest in a 
network of intergovernmental agreements and institu- 
tions that represent a significant expansion of the role of 
the executive branch of government at the expense of 
elected legislatures. These arrangements have important 
implications for democratic accountability, with conse- 
quences for the access of women and other equality- 
seelung groups to the policy making process in Canada. 
This article provides an overview of the Social Union and 
identifies some of the central challenges that it poses for 
equality seeking organizations. 
Definition and Scope 
I suggest that a definition that better captures the 
essential features of the new Social Union than that of 
Lazar is this: 
The Social Union is a network of intergovernmental 
agreements concluded between representatives of the 
executive branch at the federal andprovinciallterrito- 
rial levels, along with related institutions and proce- 
dures, that governs the transfer of resources from the 
federal to the provinciallterritorial governments to 
help finance certain social programs delivered by the 
provinceslterritories. 
There are a number of points of clarification that need 
to be made about this definition. The first is that the term 
"Social Union" as used by governments today only covers 
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some social programs; it is not generally used to include 
housing, pensions, unemployment insurance, or workers' 
compensation. Although most people would consider 
such programs an integral part of a social union, they differ 
from the Social Union programs in the ways they are 
financed. The Social Union encompasses those programs 
which either now or in the past were cost-shared by the 
federal and provincial governments. The programs asso- 
ciated with the Social Union are the children's benefits 
and services funded until 1996 under the Canada Assist- 
ance Plan, vocational training and "employability" pro- 
grams for people with disabilities, and health insurance 
and health care services.' 
A second point to note about the definition is that the 
Social Union is fundamentally a regime to govern the 
federal spending power in situations involving a federal 
contribution to provincial social programs. The federal 
spending power is the capacity of the federal Parliament to 
transfer or lend its funds to any government or institution 
. - 
or individual it chooses, for any purpose it chooses, and to 
"attach to any grant or loan any conditions it chooses, 
including conditions it could not directly legislate" (Hogg 
166). It takes two forms: transfers to other governments to 
help fund their programs, and direct transfers to individu- 
als and organizations. Examples of the first are the federal 
contribution to medicare and health care services and to 
provincial social assistance programs, and of the second, 
the former Family Allowance and the current Child Tax 
Benefit. (Specific constitutional amendments made un- 
employment insurance an exclusive federal power and 
pensions, an area of joint jurisdiction). The spending 
power became the instrument through which the federal 
government provided leadership in the construction of 
the post war welfare state after it failed to get provincial 
agreement to a realignment oftaxation and social program 
p ~ w e r s . ~  The existence of the spending power has been 
upheld by the Courts. However, it has not been accepted 
as legitimate by Quebec governments irrespective of their 
political orientation because the assignment to the prov- 
inces of exclusive jurisdiction over social welfare is consid- 
ered central to the original constitutional arrangement to 
protect the distinctive social institutions of the French 
Canadian national minority. The federal cuts in succes- 
sive budgets, most drastically that of 1995, resulted in 
other provinces temporarily lining up with the Quebec 
position, although more as a tactic to leverage more 
money from the federal government than as a matter of 
principle. 
While there tends to be rhetoric about ending duplica- 
tion and agreeing on priorities, the Social Union is only 
about common standards to the extent that the federal 
government has handed over responsibility for the estab- 
lishment of standards to an intergovernmental process. 
Negotiations at meetings of First Ministers, Ministers 
responsible for social services, or Ministers ofHealth focus 
on the objectives of the federal social transfers, not on 
harmonizing standards and programs across jurisdictions. 
Because the objectives are not enforceable the public 
announcements at the end offederal-provincial/territorial 
meetings amount to little more than public relations 
exercises. The Social Union agreements differ signifi- 
cantly from the other umbrella intergovernmental agree- 
ments concluded in the areas of trade and environmental 
policy, which do focus on the harmonization of govern- 
ment standards. In contrast to the 1994 Agreement on 
International Trade and the 1998 Canada-Wide Accord 
on Environmental Harmonization, the Social Union agree- 
- 
ments are centrally about money not about regulation. In 
these areas, business lobbied hard for harmonization 
across jurisdictions to lessen the regulatory burden of 
corporations, as they continue to do in their campaign for 
one national regulatory body for the securities industry 
(stock markets). When it comes to social welfare pro- 
grams, business organizations and neo-liberal politicians 
argue that they are inherently local and private and 
therefore appropriately the responsibility ofthe provinces. 
Alternatively, the argument is that competition among 
provinces will lead to innovation-innovation apparently 
not wanted in stock market regulation. 
A final point about the definition is that the agreements 
are benveen the executive branch (Cabinet) of govern- 
ment at the federal and provincial levels. In the past, 
intergovernmental agreements were often used as instru- 
ments to facilitate the implementation of provisions in 
federal legislation governing the transfer to the provinces. 
These agreements were bilateral agreements, between the 
federal government and a province. What is new in the 
Social Union is that the intergovernmental agreements are 
multilateral, involving nine or ten of the provinces and the 
territories, and the purposes of the transfer are set out in 
the agreement rather than in the federal statute. The Social 
Union exists in the space between governments that 
political scientists describe as "executive federalism." The 
term refers to the process of decision-making that takes 
place through relations among the political and adminis- 
trative representatives of the executive branch of govern- 
ment, which means the Cabinet and senior bureaucrats at 
the two levels of government. The expansion of the sphere 
of executive federalism has important implications for 
Canadian democracy because in our system of govern- 
ment the executive branch is accountable to the people 
through the legislature. 
Social Union Agreements and Institutions 
The new Social Union rests on a set of multilateral 
political agreements that involve the federal and all the 
provincial/territorial governments with the exception in 
most cases of the government of Quebec. At the present 
time, these agreements cover the areas of children's ben- 
efits and services, labour market programs for ~ e o p l e  with 
disabilities, and health care. With the exception of the 
CANADIAN WOMAN STUDIESILES CAHIERS DE LA FEMME 
National Child Benefit (NCB),3 the agreements are in 
written form and variously described as a communique, 
accord, framework or an exchange of letters. Although the 
agreements are often couched in the language of joint 
decision-making around policy priorities for investments 
by all governments, the money under discussion comes 
from the federal treasury. These accords are fundamen- 
tally about the mutual commitments of governments 
related to the expenditure of federal funds on social 
programs. In most cases, the federal funds take the form 
of a transfer to the provinces, although this is not the 
ments. The accountability methodology centres on direct 
reporting by the executive branch to the public using 
performance or outcomes measures developed, where 
appropriate, with the assistance of experts. SUFA envis- 
ages the development of mechanisms for avoiding and 
resolving disputes among governments and outlines some 
of the operating principles and procedures that should be 
embodied in such mechanisms. It also sketches out a role 
for an executive-federalist political body, referred to as the 
Ministerial Council, to oversee the implementation of the 
agreement. The functions of this Council, which include 
The new Canadian Social Union is manifest in a network of 
intergovernmentat agreements that have impovtant implications 
for democratic accaunlabilitlr, with consequences 
far the access of women and other equality-seeking groups ta 
the policy-making process in Canada. 
situation with respect to the National Child Benefit.4 In 
the area of disabilities, the multilateral agreement provides 
the framework for the negotiation of bilateral agreements 
between the federal government and each provincelterri- 
tory. One ofthe agreements, the Social Union Framework 
Agreement (SUFA), which was agreed to in February 
1999, is presented as an umbrella agreement, providing 
the framework for the Social Union as a whole. However, 
it was negotiated after the initial agreements on children's 
benefits and disabilities and its relationship to these and 
subsequent agreements is more political than direct. 
SUFA is an umbrella in the sense of providing political 
cover for the exercise of the federal spending power on 
social programs. Under the Agreement, the Prime Minis- 
ter accepts certain limitations on this power in exchange 
for public recognition by the First Ministers of all the 
provinceslterritories except Quebec of the legitimacy of 
the federal spending power, including when exercised 
through conditional transfers. Specifically, the Prime 
Minister agreed not to introduce any new Canada-wide 
block-funded or cost-shared initiatives without first ob- 
taining the agreement ofthe majority of the provinces. He 
further accepted a form of "opting out with compensa- 
tion" in agreeing that a provinciallterritorial government 
with programs in place that hlfil the agreed objectives 
could reinvest the money in the same or a related priority 
area. With respect to the exercise of the federal spending 
power in the form oftransfers made directly to individuals 
or organizations, he agreed only to provide at least three 
months notice to the provinceslterritories and to offer to 
consult with them to identify potential duplication and 
alternative approaches. 
SUFA is also a framework in that it endorses formally a 
new approach to accountability and to federal-provincial 
relations that is reflected in the other Social Union agree- 
supporting sector Ministers by collecting information and 
receiving reports from jurisdictions on progress in imple- 
menting the agreement, presume an administrative secre- 
tariat. Quebec is not a party to the Social Union Frame- 
work Agreement or, indeed, to any Social Union agree- 
ments outside the area of health care.5 
The agreements that underpin the new Social Union in 
the area of children's benefits and services are the: 
*National Child Benefit (NCB) Governance and 
Accountability Framework (March 12, 1998). 
*Communique on Early Childhood Development 
(September 1 1,2000). 
*Multilateral Framework on Early Learning and Care 
(March 13,2003). 
O n  November 2, 2004, the Federal-Provincial-Terri- 
torial Ministers Responsible for Social Services (except 
Quebec) announced that they had agreed upon shared 
principles to guide the development of a new national 
system of early learning and childcare and would meet 
again early in 2005 to finalize their agreement. 
The multilateral agreements on programs for people 
with disabilities are: 
*Multilateral Framework on Employability Assist- 
ance for People with Disabilities (Sept. 23, 1997). 
*Multilateral Framework for Labour Market Agree- 
ments for Persons with Disabilities (in effect April 1, 
2004). 
In the case of the disabilities Framework, the 2004 
Framework supercedes the 1997 one. As indicated above, 
the disabilities agreements govern bilateral agreements nego- 
tiated with the provinces. The health care agreements are: 
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*Communique on Health (September 11,2000). 
*Agreement on a Dispute Avoidance and Resolution 
process around the Canada Health Act (letter from 
Premier Ralph Klein to PrimeMinister Jean Chretien 
April 24, 2002). 
*Health Care Renewal Accord (February, 2003). 
*A Ten-Year Plan to Strengthen Health Care (Sep- 
tember 16,2004). 
Although there are important differences among them, 
the various agreements seem to have been written accord- 
One has the impression the First 
Ministers are making things up as they 
go alang, seeiing how mueh they can 
get away with before someone 
notices their expanding powers. 
ing to a template for the major elements. They all make 
some reference to a shared vision among governments, set 
out principles and objectives of the agreement, identify 
the funding priorities, provide for an accountabilityframe- 
work that relies heavily on public reporting, and mentions 
the importance of consulting stakeholders. Several refer to 
a "problem solving" or "dispute avoidance and resolutions 
process." The 2003 Health Renewal Accordsets out aplan 
of action that builds on the 2000 Communique on Health 
and the 2004 agreement claims to be building on the 2003 
Accord. Of the agreements listed above, Quebec has 
associated itself only with the health agreements. All the 
others include a footnote or other disclaimer noting 
Quebec's non participation. The one for the 2000 Com- 
munique on Early Childhood Development reads as 
follows: 
While sharing the same concerns on early childhood 
development, Quebec does not adhere to the present 
federal-provincial-territorial document because sec- 
tions of it infringe on its constitutional jurisdiction 
on social matters. Quebec intends to preserve its sole 
responsibility for developing, planning, managing 
and delivering early childhood development pro- 
grams. Consequently, Quebec expects to receive its 
share of any additional federal funding for early 
childhood development programs without new con- 
d' ~tlons. ' 
In the September 2004 health agreement, Quebec 
bumped its status up from a footnote to a full-fledged 
statement on "Asymmetrical Federalism that Respects 
Quebec's Jurisdiction," released on September 15,2004. 
All the agreements (with the exception of the very specific 
letter on the health disputes resolution process) have in 
common that they coincide with the announcement of 
the expenditure of money by the federal government. 
The institutional infrastructure for the Social Union is 
evolving and its final shape is not at all certain. The clearest 
statement of the structure as originally envisaged is found 
in the 1998 NCB Governance and Accountability Frame- 
work. Here, the structure took the shape of a three-level 
pyramid: at the top was to be a coordinating body consist- 
ing of the Ministers responsible for social services; this sat 
on top of a second level consisting of the FederallProvin- 
cial1Territorial Deputy Ministers responsible for social 
services that was to be delegated operational responsibil- 
ity; and at the bottom of the pyramid and holding the rest 
of the structure up was to be a Federal/Provincial/territo- 
rid Working Group ofOficials. Essentially, this structure 
provided a body with political responsibility supported by 
a secretariat. By the time of the Social Union Framework 
Agreement, almost a year later, the Ministerial body is 
referred to as the Ministerial Council and the description 
of its mandate seems to roll together the political and 
administrative responsibilities. Its role is to "support 
sector Ministers by collecting information on effective 
ways of implementing the agreement and avoiding dis- 
putes and receiving reports from jurisdictions on progress 
on commitments under the Social Union Framework 
Agreement."' More recently, the coordinating body seems 
to be meetings of First Ministers, who assume overall 
strategic responsibility, with meetings of the federal1 
provinciallterritorial Ministers responsible for health or 
social services playing a secondary and implementing role. 
The area where the intergovernmental institutions are 
most developed is health, which has two parallel health 
councils, one for Quebec and one for the rest of the 
country (minus Alberta, which has not agreed to partici- 
pate), in addition to an agreed upon intergovernmental 
disputes resolution procedure. 
Origins and Influences 
When trying to trace the evolution of the Social Union, 
one often has the impression that the First Ministers are 
making things up as they go along, perhaps seeing how 
much they can get away with before someone notices their 
expanding powers. At the same time, it is possible to 
identify the very specific political exigencies behind the 
Social Union and the international relations model that 
inspired it. 
The origins of the new Social Union lie in the 1995 
federal budget. That budget marked the final burial of the 
federal government's commitment to maintaining high 
levels of employment and its replacement by an "employ- 
ability" agenda, which places responsibility on the indi- 
vidual for hislher lack of the skills and attitudes that 
allegedly lead to employment. Implementing this agenda 
required creating insecurity for those at the bottom end of 
the labour market in order to create greater competition 
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among workers. This was achieved by removing the 
federal conditions in the Canada Assistance Plan which 
guaranteed to all residents of Canada the right to an 
adequate income based on need and prohibited provinces 
from making receipt of social assistance dependent on 
participation in work activity projects. The budget paved 
the way for provinces to receive federal funding for 
workfare projects. In anticipation of the public outcry 
against the removal of federal conditions, the budget also 
heralded a new era of "flexible federalism" in which the 
federal government would sit down with the provinces as 
equals to work out a new framework for social reform. In 
place of what then Finance Minister Paul Martin de- 
scribed as the ''unnecessary strings" and "inflexible rules" 
attached to the existing social transfers, the Minister of 
- 
Human Resources Development was to "invite repre- 
sentatives ofall the provinces to consult and work together 
to develop, through mutual consent, a set of shared 
principles and objectives . . . that could underlie the Canada 
Health and Social Transfer" for all programs except health 
which continued to be covered by the Canada HealthAct.' 
The near federalist loss in the October 1995 Quebec 
referendum on sovereignty greatly accelerated the process 
launched by the 1995 federal budget. Panicked by the 
- 
outcome, the immediate response of the Liberal govern- 
ment ofJean Chretien was to introduce into the House of 
Commons measures reminiscent of provisions in the 
failed Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Agree- 
- 
ment, including a resolution recognizing Quebec as a 
distinct society and the provincialization of training and 
housing in the February 1996 Budget. The federal gov- 
ernment then set out to prove to Quebecers that Canadian 
federalism was capable of change. The provincial govern- 
ments of English Canada recognized the situation as one 
in which they had leverage to win financial concessions 
from the federal government. Initially allying themselves 
with Quebec, they broke with the Parti Quebecois gov- 
ernment to endorse the Social Union Framework Agree- 
ment and its acceptance of the legitimacy of the federal 
spending power. The Social Union evolved as a flexible 
framework for managing the social conflicts over neo- 
liberal approaches to social policy renewal and over the 
widespread opposition in Quebec to the federal role in 
social programs. 
The inspiration for the institutions of the new Social 
Union came from international relations in which the 
primary governing instrument is the treaty among sover- 
eign countries, supported by coordinating and disputes 
resolution institutions. This model had already been 
imported into Canadian intergovernmental relations 
through environmental and trade policy, two areas strongly 
influenced by international relations. The use of multilat- 
eral framework agreements to govern relations among 
governments within Canada originated in the field of 
environmental policy in the late 1980s (Tingley). These 
agreements covering particular topics and industrial sec- 
tors are negotiated, as well as bilateral agreements among 
parties to the framework agreement. G. Bruce Doern and 
Mark Macdonald argue that negotiations around the 
Canada-U.S. and North American Free Trade Agree- 
ments brought officials from the previously separate worlds 
of international trade and federal-provincial relations 
together because of the expansion of the trade agenda to 
cover matters within provincial jurisdiction. The mutual 
learning that occurred influenced the approach to negoti- 
ating domestic intergovernmental agreements as reflected 
Implementing this agenda required 
creativlg insecurity for those at 
the boeom end of the labour market 
in order to create greater 
competition among workers. 
in the 1994 Agreement on Internal Trade, which was 
directed at bringing the regulations governing Canada's 
internal market into line with our international trade 
agreements (Doern and MacDonald). The Social Union 
borrows from the international relations model a reliance 
on multilateral framework agreements, disputes resolu- 
tions through mechanisms established by the parties to the 
agreements, and institutions to monitor and investigate 
compliance with the agreement. 
The adoption of the international relations approach to 
intergovernmental relations has important implications 
for the accountability of the executive to the legislature, 
which is the main form of democratic accountability in 
the Canadian system ofgovernment. In Canada's interna- 
tional relations, the Prime Minister does not require the 
approval of Parliament to enter into a treaty with another 
country, even though that treaty will be considered bind- 
ing on Canada by other countries. The power the Prime 
Minister is exercising in this case is known as a prerogative 
power. This is an ancient form of authority that is the 
residue of the power that the British Crown once had to 
act independently of Parliament. In most cases, Parlia- 
ment has removed the prerogative powers from the execu- 
tive and, as a result, the only legitimate basis for the 
executive to act is the authority delegated to it by a statute 
duly passed by Parliament. However, in the case of treaty- 
making, Parliament has not removed this as a prerogative 
power ofthe executive, although it could do so at any time. 
A peculiar feature of the treaty-making power, though, is 
that an international treaty only becomes part of Cana- 
dian domestic law, and therefore binding within Canada, 
when it has been implemented through legislation by 
whichever level of government has constitutional respon- 
sibility for the areas covered by the treaty. In the Social 
agreements are intended as an umbrella under which sub Union negotiations, the First Ministers appear to be 
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treating intergovernmental agreements as analogous to 
international treaties. They seem to assume that they have 
the authority to enter into agreements without any delega- 
tion of power through legislation from their respective 
legislatures, even though intergovernmental agreements 
governing CAP and earlier social transfers were governed 
by very specific delegations of power carefully set out in 
statutes. They are aware that the agreements are only 
political accords among the executive branch and are not 
binding unless implemented by legislation. By conduct- 
ing their relations through political accords rather than 
strategy of constitutional reform by non-constitutional 
means. The SUFA commitment that the federal govern- 
ment will not introduce a new cost shared or conditional 
transfer without first obtaining the support of a majority 
of the provinces is a milder version of a proposal that 
appeared in the initial package of constitutional amend- 
ments advanced by the Conservative government of Brian 
Mulroney at the beginning of the Charlottetown process. 
The proposal at that time was to subject the federal 
spending power to approval by seven provinces represent- 
ing fifty percent of the Canadian population for any new 
The provision in the Social Union Framework Agreement 
limiting the exercise of the federal spendijng power 
provides an illustration of the strategy of constittlti~nal 
reform by non-constitutional means. 
through agreements that are subordinate to legislation, 
the First Ministers are able to escape scrutiny by both their 
legislatures and the courts. This escape from democratic 
accountability seems to be one of the prime objectives of 
the new Social Union. 
Implications for Democracy and Social Equality 
During the constitutional debates around the Meech 
Lake Accord (1987 to 1990) and the Charlottetown 
Agreement (1991 to 1992), the women's movement 
brought public attention to the problems of "men in suits 
meeting behind closed doors" to redesign the Canadian 
constitution. Public anger at the role ofthe First Ministers 
during the Meech experience forced the government of 
Brian Mulroney to open up the Charlottetown process, 
resulting in a joint House of Commons and Senate 
Committee that toured the country to consult the p u b l i ~ , ~  
a series of constitutional conferences involving members 
of the public, and a referendum that ultimately rejected 
the amendments approved by the politicians. The lessons 
drawn from this experience by the political elites and some 
academics is that a democratic process of constitutional 
reform is unworkable and that the old process of "elite 
accommodation" in which trade-offs are quietly made 
- .  
among a limited group of participants is the route to go. 
While publicly proclaiming that "the last thing Canadians 
want to hear about is constitutional change," the elites 
launched a process of constitutional reform by non- 
constitutional means (Lazar). This process involved the 
extension and institutionalization of the very process of 
executive federalism that the women's movement and 
much of the public had rejected. 
The provision in SUFA limiting the exercise of the 
federal spending power provides an illustration of the 
cost shared or conditional transfers to the provinces 
(Shaping Canada i Future Together 39). This proposal was 
widely rejected in Canada outside of Quebec. After exten- 
sive public consultation and debate, including three con- 
stitutional conferences, the Special Joint Committee on a 
Renewed Canada (the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee) 
recommended that the proposal be dropped from the final 
package, which it was (Special Joint Committee on a 
Renewed Canada). The SUFArequirement is less onerous 
than that contained in the original Charlottetown propos- 
als in that it allows the federal government to proceed with 
the approval ofsix of the "have not" provinces and without 
the approval of either Quebec or Ontario. Nonetheless, 
Prime Minister Chretien agreed to a limitation of the 
federal spending power without any public debate and 
without obtaining the approval of Parliament either be- 
fore or after the negotiations. No Canadian legislature 
even debated the Social Union Framework Agreement 
except for the National Assembly of Quebec, which 
unanimously rejected it. We now have the peculiar situa- 
tion in Canada where the First Ministers can conclude 
intergovernmental agreements among themselves, with 
no legislative involvement, that commit their govern- 
ments to measures similar in principle to those dropped 
from consideration before a referendum because they 
were so unpopular. 
The expansion of the executive-federalist arena at the 
expense of the legislature raises important issues of demo- 
cratic accountability. It is true, of course, that our legis- 
latures are less effective at representing public opinion 
and holding Cabinet Ministers accountable than is desir- 
able. This is largely a consequence of Canada's first-past- 
the-post electoral system that frequently delivers major- 
ity governments resting on a minority of the popular 
vote. Yet, the legislature, through the opposition parties 
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and often through back bench members of the governing 
party, provides avenues of access for equality-seeking 
organizations that do not exist in the executive-federalist 
- 
arena. Indeed, there are procedures around the budget 
and estimates process that non-governmental organiza- 
tions could use more effectively than they do. In con- 
trast, the executive-federalist process is much more closed 
and access is easiest for the well-resourced elite lobby 
groups. Furthermore, the legislative process provides the 
opportunity for public debate on issues. The setting of 
priorities for social programs through in camera meetings 
of First Ministers and Ministers of Health or Social 
Services, with no serious accountability to the elected 
legislatures, removes decisions about the allocation of 
society's resources from the public arena. The process of 
intergovernmental institutions recasts fundamental 
choices around social priorities as technical issues of 
measuring outcomes. The social rights of citizens that 
should be central to a social union disappear from discus- 
sion in a forum in which debate revolves around the 
jurisdictional powers of governments. There is little space 
in the discourse for intervention by groups advocating 
on behalf of the disadvantaged. 
At the centre of the problems of democratic account- 
ability in the new Social Union is the substitution of the 
intergovernmental agreement for the statute. Legislation 
duly passed by Parliament at the federal or provincial level 
is the primary instrument for holding the executive ac- 
countable in the Canadian system of government. Stat- 
utes set out the limits of the power delegated by the le- 
gislature to the executive and are the basis used by both the 
Auditor General and the Courts to ensure that the actions 
of the executive conform to the purposes approved by 
Parliament.9 Depending on its wording, the statute may 
also provide the basis for individuals to claim their social 
rights where these rights are set out as either the purposes 
of the legislation or conditions attached to the federal 
social transfer to the provinces. Under the Canada Assist- 
ance Plan, the provinces were required to put in place 
procedures to allow individual applicants for and recipi- 
ents of social assistance to challenge the decisions of pro- 
vincial administrators. Much to the surprise of the federal 
government, the Courts also allowed individuals to use 
the statutes under CAP to bring a case challenging federal 
enforcement of the CAP conditions (Finlay v Canada 
(Minister ofFinanceJ. Without a statute limiting execu- 
tive action to the purposes approved by Parliament, it is 
impossible for the Auditor General or the Courts to scruti- 
nize executive action or for individuals to challenge it. 
Under the Canadian Constitution, the executive re- 
quires the approval of Parliament to raise taxes or spend 
money. It is therefore ultimately necessary for the execu- 
tive to seek the approval of Parliament for the expenditure 
commitments it makes to the provinces in securing the 
intergovernmental agreements. Traditionally, the expendi- 
ture of finds was authorized as an integral part of legisla- 
tion setting out the purposes ofthe expenditure, as was the 
case with the Canada Assistance Plan, or in financial 
legislation that supported separate legislation setting out 
the purposes and conditions of a federal social transfer, as 
is the case with the Canada Health Act. Under the Social 
Union agreements in all areas except health, the only 
federal legislation is financial. The authorization for the 
expenditures for the Canada ChildTax Benefit is found in 
the Income Tm Act, which contains no outline of the 
purposes of the Benefit. The authorization for the $ 8.3 
billion1° Canada Social Transfer to the provinces for social 
assistance, children's services and post secondary educa- 
tion is found in the Federal-ProvincialFiscalArrangements 
Act. It contains only one condition set by the federal 
government, which is that no period of minimum resi- 
dence be required or allowed for social assistance. Other- 
wise, the purposes of the Social Transfer, as set out in the 
- 
FiscalArrangementsAct, are to finance "social programs in 
a manner that provides provincial flexibility" and to 
promote any shared principles and objectives that are 
developed through the intergovernmental process con- 
vened by the Minister ofHuman Resources Development 
(s.24.3(1)). The consequence ofusing financial legislation 
rather than dedicated social legislation is that the federal 
budget becomes the primary instrument for social policy 
and the Department of Finance the chief architect of the 
Canadian Social Union. The centre ofsocial policy has for 
some time been the Social Policy Division of the Depart- 
ment of Finance rather than the social development 
departments. The substitution of the intergovernmental 
agreement for social policy statutes reinforces its power. 
The Department of Finance is a central coordinating 
agency of government that has strong ties with the most 
powerful sections of Canadian finance capital and is one 
of the agencies of government least accessible to grassroots 
organizations representing the socially disadvantaged. 
Women's organizations in Canada outside of Quebec 
- 
have tended to see recent developments in federal-provin- 
cial relations through the lens of decentralization and 
provincialization. The analysis of the Social Union in this 
article suggests the need to shift the focus a bit. Certainly, 
there is a decentralizing potential in the institutions and 
procedures of the Social Union and a right-wing Con- 
servative government led by Stephen Harper would cer- 
tainly exploit them fully. But it is not at all clear, now that 
the panics over the Quebec referendum and the budget 
deficit have subsided, that the federal Liberals favour 
further decentralization. Rather, a main objective for 
them appears to be to insulate decision-making around 
social policy from the influence of those groups with the 
most to lose from the erosion of social benefits. This is 
achieved by transferring debates from the legislative to the 
less accessible executive-federalist arena, and by treating 
- 
choices around social priorities as technical matters to be 
solved by developing performance and outcomes meas- 
ures. Another central objective of the Social Union ap- 
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proach is to manage the Quebec-Canada relationship 
through a process of elite accommodation designed to 
convince Quebecers of the possibility of a flexible and 
accommodating federalism in the absence of any real 
change. In order to make advances around social policy, 
women's organizations and other equality seeking groups 
will have to challenge the undemocratic expansion of the 
intergovernmental arena, find ways to build solidarity 
between organizations in Quebec and the rest of Canada, 
and reclaim the social union as a project centred on social 
rights rather than on the powers of governments. 
Barbara Cameron teaches political science and women ? 
studies at York University. 
'The Social Union website at www.socialunion.ca covers 
only the programs for children and people with disabilities 
but the health care was covered under the Social Union 
Framework Agreement and the subsequent health care 
accords refer to SUFA. 
'More recently, the exercise of the federal spending power 
was a crucial instrument in the deconstruction of the 
welfare state through cuts to the federal transfer to the 
provinces. For a discussion of the "negative spending 
power" see McBride (141). 
3The federal Speech from the Throne of September 23, 
1997, announced that agreement had been reached on a 
National Child Benefit initiative. There is a written NCB 
Governance and Accountability Framework, agreed to on 
March 12, 1998. 
*In the case of the Child Tax Benefit, the federal transfer 
to the provinces is indirect. The federal government 
directly transfers a benefit to low income parents through 
the tax system and certain provinces deduct a portion of 
the benefit (the National Child Benefit Supplement) from 
the welfare cheques of parents on social assistance. The 
provinces achieve this simply by treating the NCBS as 
income for purposes of social assistance. 
SQuebec has only associated itself with the 2000 Health 
Renewal Accord, which came with significant federal 
funding for the provinces; the 2003 First Ministers' 
Acccord on Health Care Renewal, when it agreed to adapt 
the mandate of its existing Council on Health and Welfare 
to collaborate with the planned Canada Health Council; 
and with the "Ten Year Plan to Strengthen Health Care" 
that resulted from the September 13-16, 2004, First 
Ministers' meeting on health care, at which Quebec 
released a separate statement on asymmetrical federalism. 
Both documents are available Online: Canadian Inter- 
governmental Conference Secretariat. http:// 
www.scics.gc.ca/confer04-e.html#Septembe (Accessed 
September 23,2004). 
6Although the full name is not given, the Council is the 
FederalIProvinciallTerritorial Council on Social Policy 
Renewal created in 1996, which consisted of Ministers at 
both levels responsible for social services. To make matters 
even more confusing, a ProvinciallTerritorial Council on 
Social Policy Renewal, first created by the Premiers in 
August 1995, continued to meet and its role seemed to be 
to develop a common provincial front in negotiations 
with the federal government. ProvinciallTerritorial Coun- 
cil on Social Policy Renewal. Progress Reportto the Premiers 
No. 6, August 1-3, 2001. 
'Federal-Provincial FiscalArrangements Act, R.S.C. 198 5, 
c. F-8, as amended by S.C. 1995, c 17, S. 13 (3). 
'This was the Special Joint Committee on a Renewed 
Canada, popularly known as the Beaudoin-Dobbie Com- 
mittee after its Chairs. 
'The Auditor General has criticized the Cabinet for failing 
to provide Parliament with the information on provincial 
expenditures of federal health care funds necessary to 
ensure that the federal money is being spent as intended by 
Parliament and has raised concerns about the absence of 
a statutory framework for the social transfers to the 
provinces under the Social Union Agreements. 
''This is the 2004-05 figure. Note that this amount 
represents cash. The federal government also counts as 
part of its transfer the value of tax points transferred to the 
provinces in 1977. The current value of these is $6.5 
billion, for a total Canada Social Transfer of $14,792 
billion. The provinces consider this money from tax 
points, which they now collect from their citizens in 
provincial taxes, as their own money and do not count it 
as part of the social transfer. 
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